



Australian Government
Centre for Population

2025 POPULATION STATEMENT

CENTRE FOR POPULATION

Strong evidence. Deep insights. Collaborative approach.



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ISBN: 978-1-923278-34-9

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In the spirit of reconciliation, the Centre for Population acknowledges the Traditional Custodians of Country throughout Australia and their connections to land, sea and community. We pay our respects to their Elders past and present and extend that respect to all Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples.

The main data source for the projections in the 2025 Population Statement is the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) *National, state and territory population*, March 2025, released in September 2025.

After the projections in this Statement were prepared, the ABS released the *National, state and territory population*, June 2025. This publication showed, consistent with this Statement, that Australia's population was 27.6 million on 30 June 2025. Net overseas migration was 306,000 in 2024–25, slightly lower than forecast in this Statement.

The forecasts in this Statement are consistent with the *2025–26 Mid-Year Economic and Fiscal Outlook* (MYEFO).

This Statement uses unit record data from Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia Survey (HILDA) supplied by the Australian Government Department of Social Services (DSS). The findings and views reported in this paper, however, are those of the authors and should not be attributed to the DSS, or any of DSS' contractors or partners. DOI:10.26193/NBTNMV.

References to years are on a financial year basis (1 July to 30 June) unless otherwise stated. Population totals for a year refer to the population as at 30 June of that year. For example, 'Australia's population was 25.6 million in 2019–20' means that Australia's population was 25.6 million as at 30 June 2020. Population flows for a year refer to flows during the financial year. For example, 'Australia's natural increase was 135,000 in 2019–20' means the natural increase in Australia's population from 1 July 2019 to 30 June 2020 was 135,000.

References to the 'states' or 'each state' include the Northern Territory and the Australian Capital Territory.

Figures in tables and in the text have been rounded. Transformations (for example, shares or rates of change) are calculated using unrounded numbers. Discrepancies between totals and the sum of components are due to rounding. In general, the rounding conventions used include:

- estimates over 10,000 are rounded to the nearest thousand
- estimates between 100 and 9,999 are rounded to the nearest 100
- estimates midway between rounding points are rounded up
- forecasts of net overseas migration at the national level are rounded to the nearest 5,000.

Estimates of future population and components of change are either forecasts or projections.

- Forecasts are predictions about what is expected to happen in the near term based on analysis and modelling in relation to current circumstances.
- Projections are based on analysis and modelling of long-term trends when rates or levels are stable. Projections may also include a transition from the last forecast to the assumed stable level or rate.

The Centre for Population thanks colleagues across the Department of the Treasury, the Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development, Communications, Sport and the Arts, the Department of Home Affairs, the Department of Education, the Department of Health, Disability and Ageing, the Department of Social Services, the National Indigenous Australians Agency, the Australian Bureau of Statistics, the Australian Government Actuary and the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare for their contributions to this Statement.

This publication mentions causes of death, including self-harm and suicide.

It also discusses fertility and family formation. We recognise that every person has a unique experience, whether a parent or not. Infertility, miscarriage and pregnancy are sensitive topics that we recognise may be emotionally challenging for some readers.

If this raises any issues for you, Lifeline provides confidential one-to-one support for people who are feeling overwhelmed or having difficulty coping. You can call Lifeline on 13 11 14 or visit lifeline.org.au.

CONTENTS

Contents	v
From the Treasurer	vi
Foreword	vii
Key points	viii
1. National population	1
1.1 Overview	1
1.2 Net overseas migration.....	5
1.3 Births.....	14
1.4 Mortality and life expectancy	21
1.5 Population ageing	25
2. Sub national populations	29
2.1 Overview of the states and territories	29
2.2 Net internal migration	31
2.3 Capital cities and rest-of-state areas	33
3. Comparing past projections to outcomes	39
Glossary	40
References	43



The Hon Dr Jim Chalmers MP

Treasurer

The Albanese Government's economic plan is all about improving living standards by boosting productivity, strengthening our budget and building resilience in our economy. These objectives were the focus of the Economic Reform Roundtable and will continue to be our focus in the lead up to the Budget.

A big part of addressing these challenges is understanding the big shifts that are underway in our economy, particularly the demographic dynamics that are shaping our communities and our country.

The 2025 Population Statement provides insights into the demographic trends that underpin the issues we have to grapple with now and into the future, helping us to engage proactively with how the population is changing and plan for the future workforce, housing, infrastructure and services we need.

The Statement projects that Australia's population will reach 31.5 million by 2035–36. Population growth is expected to slow to 1.3 per cent in 2025–26 and 1.2 per cent from 2026–27 onwards, lower than the average of 1.6 per cent experienced in the 2010s.

The Albanese Government's Migration Strategy is helping to ensure our migration system works in the national interest. Net overseas migration has fallen to 306,000 in 2024–25, close to half the post-COVID-19 pandemic peak and lower than forecast in the 2024 Population Statement due to fewer temporary migrant arrivals.

While higher than many of our international counterparts, birth rates in Australia are expected to fall to a record low in 2025–26. The Government is rolling out policies to ease pressure on families and make it easier for people to have children if they want to, including by taking the next steps in building a universal early education and care system and expanding and enhancing paid parental leave.

Population ageing is one of the five major forces reshaping Australia's economy. The median age (38.4 years in 2024–25) is expected to reach 40 years over the next decade and grow to 43.7 years by 2065–66. Population ageing will continue to drive demand for health care services and aged care, placing greater pressure on the budget.

Importantly, the Statement shows our demographics are a source of resilience. By the mid-2060s, 80 per cent of OECD countries are projected to have declining working-age populations, up from 40 per cent today. By contrast, Australia's working-age population will still be growing.

We've made a lot of progress in our economy in the past few years, including when it comes to building more homes, strengthening our migration settings, investing in skills and helping to ease the cost of living for Australians, but we recognise the job is far from over.

The Government will draw on the evidence and insights from the 2025 Population Statement to continue to build a better future for Australia.

FOREWORD



Nick Latimer
Executive Director
Centre for Population

Population changes over the next 40 years will be a major influence on Australia's economy and society. The 2025 Population Statement provides an important evidence base on Australia's population today and what we expect will happen in the coming years.

Australia's population passed 27.5 million this year, in line with the forecasts in the 2024 Population Statement. Population growth has declined from recent highs due to an easing in net overseas migration and falling fertility rates. Overall, the population is projected to be 31.5 million by 2035–36, 150,000 lower than projected in the 2024 Population Statement.

Since the projections in this Statement were prepared, the ABS has released an additional quarter of population data. The ABS estimated that net overseas migration in 2024–25 was 306,000, slightly lower than the forecast of 310,000 contained in this Statement.

Forecasting net overseas migration has been challenging since the COVID-19 pandemic. Although some aspects of migration have begun to return to more usual patterns, significant uncertainty remains. From 2025–26, net overseas migration is expected to be largely in line with the forecasts in the 2024 Population Statement. This year's Statement provides new analysis on recent migration trends and provides insights into the factors driving the forecasts.

As fertility has declined around the world, it has been of growing interest in public policy debate. Fertility has also been a major focus for the Centre for Population this year. The 2025 Population Statement features the Centre's first pieces of analysis of fertility intentions, and the role of Medically Assisted Reproduction.

This year's Statement features the Centre's new experimental 40-year projections of state and sub-state level populations. These projections are a new capability for the Centre, and provide more insights on how the populations of Australia's capital cities and regional areas will grow and age over time. By 2065–66, 72 per cent of Australians are expected to reside in capital cities, up from 68 per cent today. Melbourne and Sydney are both expected to have populations of over 8 million by the end of the 2050s.

In 2025, the Centre supported Australia's first-time hosting of the International Population Conference. This prestigious event brought experts from around the world together to discuss population issues. Together with the Department of Home Affairs and the Australian Bureau of Statistics, the Centre presented at the conference on Australia's population story. The event also facilitated engagement with international counterparts including the United Nations, the Government of Japan and the European Commission to learn from others' experiences and expertise on population issues.

The Centre is proud to have presented to over 3,000 people throughout 2025 on a broad spectrum of population issues, helping to build the evidence base and inform public discussion. The engagement has been across governments, researchers, academics and international institutions. We look forward to continuing to provide an evidence base that helps Australia prepare for demographic change.

KEY POINTS

Australia's population growth has slowed over the past year



- Australia's population was 27.5 million in the March quarter 2025.
- Population growth is expected to slow to 1.3 per cent in 2025–26, driven by an easing in net overseas migration and a decline in the total fertility rate.
- The population is projected to be 31.5 million by 2035–36, 150,000 lower than projected in the 2024 Population Statement.

Net overseas migration has decreased



- Net overseas migration is expected to be 260,000 in 2025–26. This is well below its peak of 556,000 in the year to the September quarter 2023.
- Lower net overseas migration has been driven by fewer temporary migrant arrivals, particularly by those holding student and visitor visas.
- While departures have increased in absolute terms since 2023–24, migrants on temporary visas are departing Australia at lower rates than in the past.

The total fertility rate is declining



- The total fertility rate is expected to fall to 1.42 in 2025–26. It has been below the replacement rate of 2.1 children per woman for almost 50 years.
- There has been a gradual decline in fertility intentions in Australia since 2001.
- Two-child families are the most common family size in Australia. Smaller families have been on the rise and larger families have declined.

Australia continues to have one of the highest life expectancies in the world



- By 2035–36, life expectancy is expected to reach 87.1 years for women and 83.4 years for men.
- The five leading causes of death accounted for one third of all registered deaths in 2024.
- Dementia is now the leading cause of death, overtaking ischaemic heart disease.

Australia remains younger than many similar economies, but we continue to age



- Australia's population is ageing because of lower fertility rates and higher life expectancy.
- The median age is expected to rise by 1.8 years to 40.2 years by 2035–36. This is half the rate of ageing that happened in the 1990s.
- By 2065–66, there will be 1.9 million people aged 85 and over, more than triple the number today.

Population growth and ageing vary widely across Australia



- Western Australia is expected to have the highest population growth rate at 1.8 per cent in 2025–26, while Tasmania is expected to have the lowest at 0.1 per cent.
- On average, capital cities are projected to grow nearly twice as fast as the rest-of-state areas, with Sydney and Melbourne both projected to pass 8 million in the 2050s.
- Populations in regional areas are older than in capital cities in all states and territories, except the Northern Territory.

1. NATIONAL POPULATION

1.1 OVERVIEW

The Australian population was 27.5 million in the March quarter 2025. This is in line with the Centre for Population's forecasts in the 2024 Population Statement. The Centre is forecasting the population to reach 28 million by the end of 2025–26 and grow to 41 million by 2065–66 (Table 1).

The rate of annual population growth is forecast to decrease from its peak of 2.5 per cent in 2022–23 to an average of 1.2 per cent from 2026–27 onwards (Chart 1). This is below the average growth rate of 1.6 per cent¹ experienced in the 2010s. The decrease is expected to be driven by an easing in net overseas migration and a lower total fertility rate. Australia's population remains lower than was projected prior to the COVID-19 pandemic and is forecast to remain so over the forecast period.

Net overseas migration (NOM) in 2024–25 was forecast to be 310,000. Since the forecast was prepared, the ABS released additional data, estimating that NOM was 306,000 in 2024–25. This is well below its peak of 556,000 in the year to the September quarter 2023 and is largely due to fewer migrant arrivals (Chart 2). This reflects a return to more usual migration patterns compared with the surge that followed the reopening of the border, and measures introduced to improve integrity in international education.

NOM is forecast to decline further in 2025–26 and 2026–27, driven by fewer migrant arrivals and an increase in migrant departures. However, departures are expected to be lower than in the 2024 Statement as migrants on temporary visas are departing at lower rates than experienced in the past. Over the longer-term, NOM is assumed to return to 235,000 per year, the same as in previous statements.

While remaining above many of our international counterparts, Australia's total fertility rate (TFR) is expected to fall to a record low of 1.42 in 2025–26. By 2031–32, the TFR is expected to recover to 1.62 and remain at that level in the long run. Australia's median age is expected to continue to increase due to low fertility rates and increasing life expectancy. The median age is expected to rise by 1.8 years to 40.2 years by 2035–36. This is around half the rate of ageing in the 1990s.

Table 1. POPULATION OUTCOMES AND PROJECTIONS, AUSTRALIA

	2023–24*	2024–25	2025–26	2026–27	2035–36	2065–66
Population at 30 June (millions)	27.2	27.6	28.0	28.3	31.5	41.0
Population growth (%)	2.0	1.5	1.3	1.2	1.1	0.7
Population growth ('000)	534	417	362	332	354	304
Natural increase ('000)	105	105	99	105	119	69
<i>Births</i>	290	289	286	295	354	415
<i>Deaths</i>	185	183	186	190	235	346
Net overseas migration ('000)	429	310	260	225	235	235
<i>Migrant arrivals</i>	661	575	565	560	555	555
<i>Migrant departures</i>	232	260	305	330	320	320
Median age (years)	38.3	38.4	38.6	38.8	40.2	43.7
Old-age dependency ratio	26.5	26.9	27.4	27.9	31.0	38.7


* Actuals.

Note: The old-age dependency ratio is the number of people aged 65 years and over per 100 people aged 15 to 64. Since the forecasts in this table were prepared, the ABS has released an additional quarter of population data, covering the period to the end of the 2024–25 financial year.

Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS), *National, state and territory population, March 2025*; Centre for Population.

1 This figure was corrected in March 2026.


Chart 1. POPULATION GROWTH, AUSTRALIA



Note: Intercensal difference refers to the difference between the estimated resident population after incorporating the results of the 2021 Census and previously published estimates.

Source: ABS, *National, state and territory population, March 2025*; Centre for Population.

Chart 2. CHANGE IN PROJECTED POPULATION GROWTH COMPARED TO THE 2024 POPULATION STATEMENT




Note: This chart illustrates the contribution of individual components to the change in population growth. Fewer departures or deaths compared to the 2024 Population Statement result in higher population growth and are shown as positive.

Source: ABS, *National, state and territory population, March 2025*; Centre for Population.

1.1.1 INTERNATIONAL POPULATION GROWTH

Population growth is declining internationally (Chart 3). In countries similar to Australia, lower levels of NOM are a major driver of this decline. Several countries have been significantly tightening migration policy, including the United States, United Kingdom and Canada.² In New Zealand, NOM is lower in part because relatively weak labour market conditions have resulted in more departures from New Zealand to Australia.³

Chart 3. ANNUAL POPULATION GROWTH OF SELECTED COUNTRIES



Note: The most recent data available for each jurisdiction was used. The end points of the data series differ between jurisdictions.

Source: ABS; Stats NZ; Statistics Canada; Office for National Statistics (ONS); U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis.

2 U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, [First 100 Days: USCIS Delivery on Making America Safe Again](#), U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services website, 2025; C J McKinney and M Gower, [Changes to UK visa and settlement rules after the 2025 immigration white paper](#), House of Commons Library, 2025; Government of Canada, [Government of Canada reduces immigration](#), Government of Canada website, 2024.


3 S Ranchhod, [Comparing economic conditions in New Zealand and Australia](#), Westpac New Zealand Economics, 2025.

Box 1. POPULATION STABILISATION: ANALYSIS OF REDUCED NOM

The Centre has modelled a case study where the population is stabilised at 30 million through a reduction in NOM to explore the implications for population ageing and growth in the working-age population.


To stabilise the population at 30 million, NOM would have to fall from its current projection of 235,000 to 32,000 per year by 2035–36, assuming other aspects of the baseline projections are unchanged (Chart 4). Sustained lower migration levels would lead to fewer births, which would eventually result in natural decrease (deaths exceeding births) from 2049–50.

Chart 4. POPULATION COMPARISON



Source: ABS, *National, state and territory population, March 2025*; Centre for Population.

Chart 5. POPULATIONS BY AGE GROUP



Source: ABS, *National, state and territory population, March 2025*; Centre for Population.

Reducing NOM by this magnitude would significantly accelerate population ageing (Chart 5). The median age would rise to 47 years by 2065–66 instead of to 43.7 years in the baseline projection. The growth of the working-age population would stall within a few years, remaining at around 18 million until 2043–44 when it would begin to decline continuously to the end of the projection period.

The population aged over 65 years would continue to grow at a similar rate to the current projections. The old-age dependency ratio would increase from 26.5 to 50.4 in 2065–66. This is in comparison to the baseline projection ratio of 38.7 in 2065–66. This would create greater fiscal pressure to meet higher demand for services from a shrinking tax base.


Generally, changes to the population can be thought of as having a roughly proportionate impact on GDP, assuming they have no change on average productivity or participation. For example, a one-year reduction in NOM of around 100,000 would reduce the population aged 15 and over by around 0.4 per cent and, over time, would likely result in the level of GDP being around 0.4 per cent lower. In this analysis, the reduction in NOM results in the population aged 15 and over being 26 per cent smaller by 2065–66, implying that the level of GDP would be around a quarter lower.

1.2 NET OVERSEAS MIGRATION

NOM was forecast to be 310,000 in 2024–25 and then decline to 260,000 in 2025–26. Since the forecast was prepared, the ABS has released another quarter of data, estimating that NOM was 306,000 in 2024–25. This is well below the peak of 556,000 in the year to September 2023 (Chart 6). The forecast is informed by early indicators of migration, including adjusted permanent and long-term border crossings (Box 2).


The decrease in 2024–25 is largely due to fewer temporary migrant arrivals. The decline in 2025–26 is expected to be driven by more migrant departures, as many of those who arrived on a temporary visa following the reopening of the border approach the expiry date of their visa (Chart 7). However, there is considerable uncertainty in the outlook for departures. Departure rates are lower than prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, reflecting Australia's relatively favourable economic conditions, including the low unemployment rate.

Chart 6. OVERSEAS MIGRATION, YEAR-ENDING



Source: ABS, *National, state and territory population, March 2025*; Centre for Population.

Chart 7. OVERSEAS MIGRATION BY VISA GROUP AND DIRECTION



Source: ABS, *Overseas Migration, 2023-24*; Centre for Population.

Box 2. USING OVERSEAS ARRIVALS AND DEPARTURES AND MIGRATION STATISTICS

The ABS publishes permanent and long-term (PLT) border crossings in Overseas Arrivals and Departures (OAD) statistics. The ABS cautions that these are not migration statistics. Because OAD is available earlier than migration statistics, PLT movements are sometimes used as a proxy for migration. However, there are differences between migration and PLT statistics that can result in substantial divergences between the two.

For example, consider a student who arrives and lives in Australia for three years. Their first arrival counts as one migrant arrival. When they leave Australia after three years, this is a migrant departure. The student may also make some short overseas trips in between, which are neither migrant departures nor arrivals.


However, in OAD statistics, the student may be considered a long-term arrival each time they return from a short overseas trip if they state on their Incoming Passenger Card that they will stay in Australia for at least 12 months. Due to the way temporary visa departures are classified in OAD, each of their departures (even their final departure from Australia) would be classified as short-term if it occurs within 12 months of a previous arrival. This person would therefore generate multiple PLT arrivals and no PLT departures, despite constituting only one migrant arrival and one migrant departure.

Given these issues, net PLT movements of temporary visa holders are usually substantially higher than NOM. Conversely, net PLT movements of Australian citizens are generally much lower than NOM, as OAD treats many non-resident Australian citizens leaving Australia as long-term resident departures. Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, these differences mostly offset each other, so net PLT movements roughly tracked NOM.

As travel patterns changed during and after the pandemic, and as the temporary visa holder population has grown, the difference between net PLT and NOM has increased and become more volatile (Chart 8). The difference for permanent visa holders has also increased recently, due to the way recipients of onshore grants are classified on return from their first overseas trip after receiving the visa.


The Centre adjusts PLT data to improve its accuracy as an early indicator of migration. For example, the Centre adjusts PLT arrivals on temporary visas by excluding anyone who departed Australia within the previous 12 months. This provides a reliable indicator of change in temporary migrant arrivals (Chart 9).

Chart 8. DIFFERENCE BETWEEN NET PLT AND NOM, YEAR-ENDING



Source: Centre for Population analysis of custom data from ABS, *Overseas Arrivals and Departures*, September 2025.

Chart 9. ADJUSTED PLT ARRIVALS, TEMPORARY VISAS, YEAR-ENDING



Note: Excludes visitor visa movements.
Source: Centre for Population analysis of custom data from ABS, *Overseas Arrivals and Departures*, September 2025.

1.2.1 TEMPORARY VISA MIGRATION

Temporary visa migrant arrivals have been declining and are lower than forecast in the 2024 Population Statement (Chart 10). This has largely been driven by lower migrant arrivals on student and visitor visas. Despite migrants on temporary visas departing Australia at lower rates than prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, the level of departures has increased since 2023–24 and is expected to continue to rise. The size and speed of this increase is uncertain. Departures will be influenced by the effect and timing of recent policy changes and the extent to which temporary visa holders stay longer in Australia by applying for subsequent visas.

ARRIVALS

Lower student arrivals reflect a drop in demand to study in Australia relative to the period immediately following the reopening of the border, and a suite of measures introduced by the Government to improve integrity in the international education sector. These measures include the new Genuine Student requirement and reforms to English language requirements.⁴

International education integrity measures have contributed to a reduction in student visa lodgements from outside Australia. Offshore lodgements fell by 106,000 to 257,000 in 2024–25.⁵ The decline, as a share of total lodgements, was strongest in the Vocational Education and Training (VET) and independent English Language Intensive Courses for Overseas Students (ELICOS) sectors.

Visitor visa migrant arrivals are people who arrive on a visitor visa and stay long enough to be counted as a migrant. Most of these people subsequently transition to a different visa, though some may stay in Australia on visitor visas for longer periods.

Visitor visa migrant arrivals were above the pre-pandemic average following the reopening of the border, in part due to many people arriving in Australia on visitor visas and then transitioning to other visas after their arrival. From July 2024, visitor visa holders have no longer been able to apply for student visas while in Australia, which has contributed to a decline in visitor visa migrant arrivals.⁶

Working holiday visa migrant arrivals remain high due to strong demand to work and travel in Australia, and because many working holiday makers are staying in Australia for longer than 12 months and are therefore counted as migrants. This partly reflects changes to the requirements for UK citizens – who form the largest cohort of working holiday visa arrivals – to obtain a second or third working holiday visa and extend their stay beyond 12 months. The change in the requirements was due to an agreement with the UK that began in July 2024.⁷ From 2014–15 to 2018–19, an average of 21 per cent of first visa holders were granted a second visa the following year. This share increased to 39 per cent from 2023–24 to 2024–25.⁸


4 Study Australia, [Student and Temporary Graduate Visa changes: 2024](#), Australian Trade and Investment Commission (Austrade) website, 2024.

5 Department of Home Affairs, [BP0015 Student visas lodged](#), data.gov.au, 2025.

6 Study Australia, [Changes to onshore Student visa applications](#), Austrade, 2024.

7 Department of Home Affairs, [New Working Holiday Maker \(WHM\) arrangements for UK passport holders](#), Department of Home Affairs Immigration and Citizenship website, 2024.

8 Department of Home Affairs, [BP0017 Working Holiday Maker visa applications granted](#), data.gov.au, 2025.

Chart 10. TEMPORARY VISA MIGRATION FORECAST, COMPARISON OF 2024 AND 2025 POPULATION STATEMENTS

Source: 2024 Population Statement; ABS, *National, state and territory population, March 2025*; Centre for Population.

DEPARTURES

Temporary visa migrant departures have been increasing since 2023–24, as many people who arrived after border restrictions were lifted have now reached the expiry date of their visas. Departures are forecast to continue to increase throughout 2025–26 and 2026–27 as this effect continues to play out.

However, the forecast increase in temporary visa departures is smaller than in the 2024 Population Statement. In part, this is due to fewer temporary visa arrivals in recent data and across the forecasts, which flow through to smaller cohorts of departures in the future. It also reflects migrants on temporary visas departing the country at lower rates than seen in the past (Box 3). This has contributed to higher NOM since the reopening of the border from late 2021 and is a key source of uncertainty in the outlook for departures.

Lower departure rates reflect the aspirations of migrants on temporary visas to remain in Australia, driven by high living standards and favourable labour market conditions. Temporary migrants who arrived following the reopening of the border are trending towards longer stays in Australia by transitioning to other temporary visas or obtaining a permanent visa. Migrants on temporary visas who arrived before the COVID-19 pandemic have departed at slower rates following the border closures, which may indicate stronger ties to Australia formed in that period.

Recent growth in the number of temporary graduate visa (TGV) holders in Australia has also contributed to uncertainty around departures. A TGV allows international students who have recently completed study in Australia to temporarily live, work and continue further study here. The number of TGV holders in Australia grew from 95,000 in September 2019 to 239,000 in September 2025, or from 6 per cent to 11 per cent of all temporary visa holders.⁹ As the TGV has been a common pathway to permanent residency, the increase in the number of people on TGVs is likely to indicate a growing number of people onshore who aspire to permanent residency.

⁹ Department of Home Affairs, [BP0019 Temporary visa holders in Australia](#), data.gov.au, 2025.

In addition, the Department of Home Affairs has a significant number of onshore visa applications to process and people can remain on a bridging visa while awaiting a decision. Applying for a protection visa, with a very low chance of success, has also allowed some migrants to extend their stay in Australia. The Government has provided funding for real-time priority processing of protection visa applications to address high volumes of applications. The package focused on 'last-in-first-out' processing, through which unmeritorious cohorts are prioritised and processed rapidly to reduce the time a person remains in Australia awaiting a protection visa decision. Priority processing has reduced the number of people waiting on protection visas and is helping to deter misuse of the migration system.

If a visa application is unsuccessful, the decision can be appealed through the Administrative Review Tribunal (ART), during which people can legally remain in the country. In the 2024–25 Budget, the Government provided \$1 billion to establish and support the operation of the ART. This included funding to establish hubs dedicated to migration and protection matters to ease pressure on the federal courts.

Long wait times persist for migration matters at the ART. High volumes of refused protection visa applications are being appealed to the ART. The number of people who have been refused a protection visa by the Department of Home Affairs and have not yet left Australia increased from 55,000 in November 2020 to 103,000 in November 2025.¹⁰

Additionally, the number of active student visa refusal cases awaiting review by the ART has increased from 11,000 in June 2024 to 46,000 in October 2025.¹¹ The median processing time of student visa refusal cases finalised between May and October 2025 was 65 weeks.¹² In the 2025–26 MYEFO, the Government announced \$69 million over two years from 2025–26 to continue addressing the backlog of ART cases.

10 Department of Home Affairs, [Monthly Update: Onshore Protection PPV \(subclass 866\) Visa Processing](#), Department of Home Affairs website, 2020; Department of Home Affairs, [Monthly Update: Onshore Protection PPV \(subclass 866\) Visa Processing](#), Department of Home Affairs website, 2025.

11 Administrative Appeals Tribunal, [MRD caseload summary by subclass](#), ART website, 2024; [Migration Jurisdictional Area caseload summary](#), ART website, 2025.


12 ART, [Processing times](#), ART website, 2025.

Box 3. THE CHANGING LENGTH OF STAY OF MIGRANTS ON TEMPORARY VISAS

The length of time that migrants on temporary visas stay in Australia varies considerably and does not necessarily match the length of their initial visa. It is influenced by their reason for travelling to Australia, the visa they hold when they first arrive, and options available to obtain subsequent visas during their stay. Policy settings, economic conditions and living standards also shape how long a migrant stays. Previous research by the Centre found that 57 per cent of migrants who arrived in 2006–07 on a student, temporary skilled or working holiday maker visa remained in Australia after 10 years.¹³

The Centre has developed new analysis of the length of stay of temporary migrants. The cumulative share of temporary visa migrant arrivals that have departed over time provides an indication of the expected length of stays of each migrant cohort (Chart 11). Each line represents an arrival cohort – for example, 56 per cent of migrants who arrived on a temporary visa in 2011–12 had departed after 10 years. Many of the 44 per cent who were still in Australia will have obtained permanent visas. In the 10 years to 2023–24, 56 per cent of visas granted under the Permanent Migration Program were to people already in Australia.¹⁴ Others may remain in Australia after transitioning to other temporary visas.

Chart 11. MIGRANT ARRIVALS ON TEMPORARY VISAS, BY YEAR OF ARRIVAL: CUMULATIVE SHARE THAT HAVE DEPARTED OVER TIME



Source: Centre for Population analysis of custom data from the ABS.

The median duration of a temporary migrant’s stay in Australia has been lengthening over time. Temporary migrants who arrived in 2011–12 recorded a median stay of around six years. However, temporary migrants who arrived from 2012–13 onwards have tended to stay longer. The change in composition of temporary migration has contributed to this, including an increase in student migrant arrivals from several countries who tend to stay longer and increases in the numbers of temporary graduate visa and bridging visa holders.

The trend towards longer stays continued for temporary migrants who arrived in the few years before COVID-19 border restrictions. For example, the cohorts that arrived in 2018–19 initially departed at similar rates to previous cohorts but then departed at far slower rates from 2020. This is indicated by the cumulative departure line flattening out. This was made possible by the introduction of the Pandemic Event Visa in April 2020, which allowed temporary visa holders to remain in Australia lawfully while the border was closed. The visa was closed to new applicants in September 2023.¹⁵ Temporary migrants who arrived after the border reopened have also been staying longer than those who arrived before the COVID-19 pandemic.

1.2.2 PERMANENT VISA, NEW ZEALAND CITIZEN AND AUSTRALIAN CITIZEN MIGRATION


NOM of permanent visa holders is forecast to be 70,000 in 2025–26, which is consistent with historical levels (Chart 12). The number of permanent visa arrivals is driven by the Permanent Migration Program. The 2025–26 Migration Program is set at 185,000 places – the same size as the 2024–25 Migration Program.¹⁶ Not all permanent visa grants result in a new migrant arrival because many visas granted within the Migration Program are to people who are already living in Australia on a temporary visa. A number of permanent visa holders also depart Australia each year, which reduces NOM for permanent visa holders.

Net migration of New Zealand citizens remains high due to elevated arrival numbers. New Zealand citizens can freely live and work in Australia. Recent high numbers of New Zealand citizen arrivals reflect Australia’s relatively favourable economic conditions, including the lower unemployment rate. This trend is expected to continue, with NOM of New Zealand citizens forecast to be 35,000 in 2025–26.

Other than the COVID-19 pandemic period, annual NOM of Australian citizens has consistently been negative. In line with this historical trend, the annual net outflow of Australian citizens is expected to be 20,000 in 2024–25 and then decline to 15,000 in 2025–26.

The extent to which changes in NOM affect dwelling demand depends on factors including visa class and age. Temporary migrants tend to have lower dwelling demand per person than Australian citizens, permanent migrants, and New Zealand citizens (Box 4).

Chart 12. PERMANENT VISA, NEW ZEALAND CITIZEN AND AUSTRALIAN CITIZEN NOM, YEAR-ENDING



Source: ABS, *National, state and territory population*, March 2025; Centre for Population.

13 Centre for Population, [Pathways from temporary visas to permanent residency: a case study of migrants that arrived in 2006–07](#), Department of the Treasury, Australian Government, 2023.

14 Department of Home Affairs, [Permanent Migration Program \(Skilled & Family\) Outcomes Snapshot – Annual Statistics](#), data.gov.au, 2025.

15 Department of Home Affairs, [Temporary Activity visa \(subclass 408\)](#), Department of Home Affairs website, 2025.

16 Department of Home Affairs, [Migration Program planning levels](#), Department of Home Affairs website, 2025.

Box 4. DWELLING DEMAND BY CITIZENSHIP AND VISA CLASS


Dwelling demand varies by age, family structure, citizenship, and visa class. Insights into dwelling demand of individuals can inform decisions about the appropriate mix of new housing in Australia. Australian citizens, permanent migrants and New Zealand citizens have similar average dwelling demand, while many temporary migrants have lower average dwelling demand.

To understand the dwelling demand of individuals better, the Centre has estimated average household representation propensity by citizenship and visa class (see Glossary and Technical Appendix for further details). Dwelling demand depends on the living arrangements people adopt in Australia. Average dwelling demand of individuals is lowest among temporary migrants while demand from New Zealand citizens and permanent migrants is broadly in line with Australian citizens (Chart 13).

Working holiday makers and international students are more likely to be young and form group households or live in non-private dwellings such as residential colleges or hostels. Permanent migrants and New Zealand citizens are more likely to reside in households as a couple with children. These differences in housing formation and composition are reflected in the variation of dwelling demand by citizenship and visa class.¹⁷

While the demand for housing among permanent migrants is in line with the total population, the immediate impact of reductions to the Permanent Migration Program on housing demand would be relatively limited. This is because many permanent visas are granted to individuals already in Australia on a temporary visa – in 2024–25, this was 55 per cent of the 185,000 Permanent Migration Program visa grants. Average dwelling demand of a migrant arriving on a partner visa is dependent on their living arrangements (i.e. group or couple household) when they arrive. They may add to demand if new household formation occurs – such as when their partner in Australia leaves a group household to instead share a dwelling with them. In this analysis, if partners live in a dwelling together (without any others) then each partner contributes demand for 0.5 dwellings.

Chart 13. ESTIMATED AVERAGE DWELLING DEMAND PER PERSON, TOTAL POPULATION AND BY CITIZENSHIP AND VISA CATEGORY



Note: Dwelling demand of children aged less than 15 is reflected in the demand of the parent or guardian as children cannot live alone and demand a separate dwelling (see Technical Appendix for further details). 2016 Census data was used for this analysis because 2021 data reflected COVID-19 pandemic border closures and lockdowns. Total temporary migrants excludes NZ citizens.

Source: ABS, Australian census and temporary entrants integrated dataset; ABS, Australian census and migrants integrated dataset; ABS, Census of Population and Housing, 2016; Centre for Population.

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BOX 4. DWELLING DEMAND BY CITIZENSHIP AND VISA CLASS (CONTINUED)


Dwelling demand also varies by age (Chart 14). Young Australians often remain in the family home during their late teens and early twenties, which reduces the rate of household formation and dwelling demand. The cost of housing, particularly renting, can affect the rate of household formation for young Australians. Temporary migrants in the same age group tend to form individual or group households upon arriving in Australia.

As people enter their late twenties and early thirties, they increasingly form new households as singles, couples, or young families, contributing to dwelling demand. Temporary migrants in this age group tend to follow similar housing formation patterns to Australian citizens, though their overall dwelling demand is lower.

People entering their retirement years tend to live in smaller households, and average dwelling demand increases. Dwelling demand per person rises with fewer individuals living in the family home. Later in life, individuals may experience widowhood, or their partner may move into care. These factors may explain the peak in dwelling demand for Australian citizens in the 80–84 age group.

The dwelling demand of temporary migrants peaks in their early fifties before declining until their early eighties, likely due to older temporary migrants living in multigenerational arrangements. There is a relatively small proportion of temporary migrants over the age of 50 in Australia.¹⁸

Chart 14. ESTIMATED AVERAGE DWELLING DEMAND BY AGE, AUSTRALIAN CITIZENS AND TEMPORARY VISA HOLDERS



Note: Dwelling demand of children less than 15 is reflected in the demand of the parent or guardian as children do not live alone (see Technical Appendix for further details). Permanent migrants and New Zealand citizens are not represented in this chart.

Source: ABS, *Australian census and temporary entrants integrated dataset*; ABS, *Census of Population and Housing, 2016*; Centre for Population.

17 Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS), *Microdata and TableBuilder: Temporary visa holders in Australia*, 2016; ABS, *Microdata and TableBuilder: Permanent migrants in Australia*, 2016; ABS, *Census of Population and Housing, 2016*.


18 ABS, *Microdata and TableBuilder: Temporary visa holders in Australia*; ABS, *Census of Population and Housing*.

1.3 BIRTHS

Australia's total fertility rate (TFR) has been below the replacement level of 2.1 children per woman for nearly five decades (Chart 15).¹⁹ In 2024–25, the total fertility rate is expected to fall to 1.45 children per woman.

The decline in the TFR has been driven by lower fertility rates among women aged under 30. This is part of a broader trend of delaying parenthood, with many people choosing to have children later in life. However, this delay is not being fully offset by higher fertility rates at older ages. Many women who start families later have fewer children overall, either by choice or by circumstance. As a result, overall fertility rates have declined.

Chart 15. TOTAL FERTILITY RATE



Source: ABS, *Historical population, 2021*; ABS, *National, state and territory population, March 2025*; Centre for Population.

Medicare pregnancy scan data suggests that the TFR will continue its downward trajectory in 2025–26, reaching 1.42. The TFR is then projected to gradually return to and stabilise at the Centre's long-run projection of 1.62 by 2031–32. This reflects Australia's low proportion of childless families and the historical tendency for delayed births to occur later in life.

As the TFR moves towards the long-run level, and the number of potential parents grows with the population, annual births are forecast to increase to 354,000 in 2035–36. However, population ageing is expected to reduce the rate of growth, with the share of women in the peak childbearing ages of 26 to 37 years old expected to fall from 8.9 per cent of the population in 2023–24 to 8.5 per cent in 2035–36.

Fertility rates among First Nations people remain higher than for the wider Australian population. The First Nations TFR increased from 1.94 in 2014 to 2.13 in 2024, although has been declining since 2023. Over the same period, Australia's aggregate TFR declined from 1.80 to 1.48. In 2024, approximately 25,000 First Nations children were born, accounting for 8.6 per cent of all registered births.


¹⁹ ABS, [Births, Australia](#), 2024.

1.3.1 SMALLER FAMILIES AND DELAYED FERTILITY

Although Australia's total fertility rate has declined, the two-child norm has remained strong and relatively stable among those having children (Chart 16). However, there have been changes on either side of the two-child family size.

Smaller family sizes (zero to one child) have been on the rise, and the proportion of larger family sizes (three or more children) has declined substantially. These changes reflect broad fertility trends, including delayed childbearing.²⁰

Chart 16. SHARE OF WOMEN AGED 45–49: NUMBER OF CHILDREN



Source: ABS, *Census of Population and Housing, 1981–2021*.

From 1992–93 to 2021–22, the average age of mothers at the time of their first birth increased from 26 to 31 years of age (Chart 17).²¹ The factors driving this trend include increased female labour force participation, greater educational attainment and changing personal preference. In recent decades, other factors – such as job insecurity, higher living costs and limited access to affordable childcare – have also emerged.²² For many women, delayed births are ‘caught up’ later in life. For others, remaining childless or having a smaller family may be the result of personal choice or circumstance.


In demography, recuperation refers to the tendency of a specific birth cohort of women to partially or fully compensate for delayed childbearing by having children at older ages. A woman who has two children in her mid-to-late thirties, rather than in her twenties, illustrates this concept. While her contribution to the total fertility rate in her twenties is lower, she contributes to the total fertility rate at older ages.

20 L Qu, J Baxter, C Andersson and R Jenkinson, *Births in Australia*, Australian Institute of Family Studies website, 2024.

21 Figures reflect the modal age of first-time mothers, adjusted for population distribution.

22 Centre for Population, *Fertility decline: is it here to stay?*, Department of the Treasury, Australian Government, 2024.

Chart 17. BIRTHS PER WOMAN, BY AGE OF MOTHER, FOR FIRST, SECOND AND THIRD OR HIGHER BIRTHS



Note: 2021-22 is the most recent parity (birth order) data by age.
 Source: Custom data from Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (AIHW); ABS, *Quarterly population estimates (ERP) by state/territory, sex and age*; Centre for Population.

Over the past 30 years, there has been a clear pattern of recuperation in first births (women having their first child later in life). The proportion of women having at least one birth by age 49 has fallen only slightly from 89.9 per cent for mothers born in 1945 to 85.4 per cent for mothers born in 1975. However, the proportion of women with two or more births by cohort has fallen from 80.6 per cent to 69.7 per cent over the same period.

Recuperation has been notably weaker for third or higher births. Among women born in 1945, 44.9 per cent had three or more children, and this proportion fell to 27.8 per cent for women born in 1975. As women increasingly postpone their first and second births, fewer progress to having a third or subsequent child. The fall in third or higher births is influenced by a range of factors, including age-related fertility challenges and changing preferences around family size (Box 5).


Box 5. UNDERSTANDING FERTILITY PATTERNS IN AUSTRALIA

Two-child families are the most common family size in Australia and, based on fertility intentions, they are also the most desired. Fertility intentions measure the number of children an individual would like to have in knowledge of their economic, social and individual constraints.

There has been a gradual decline in fertility intentions on average since 2001 – falling below 2.1 in 2018 (Chart 18). Fertility intentions have declined at a faster rate since 2018 and reached 1.89 children per woman in 2022. The rapid decline is likely to have been influenced by the uncertainty caused by the COVID-19 pandemic affecting fertility planning and decision making, as well as changes and transitions in employment and partnership.

Fertility intentions have tended to exceed the total fertility rate. For example, fertility intentions in 2022 were 1.89 children per woman, while the TFR in 2021–22 was 1.69. If fertility intentions had been fulfilled between 2001 and 2022, there could have been 881,000 additional births. This would have lowered the median age of the population by 1.3 years to 37 years of age. The median age has not been this low since 2010. The gap between fertility intentions and actual births suggests individuals may be falling short of achieving their intended family size. This is a challenge for Australia’s demographic future.²³

Chart 18. TOTAL FERTILITY RATE AND AVERAGE FERTILITY INTENTIONS PER WOMAN



Source: Centre for Population analysis of Household, Income and Labour Dynamics (HILDA) survey data; ABS, *Births*.


There are many individual, social, cultural and economic factors that influence an individual’s decisions and ability to start a family or increase their family size, and when they choose to do so. Individuals may be limited in achieving their fertility intentions due to infertility. In Australia, around one in nine couples experience fertility issues, which can take many forms.²⁴ Medically Assisted Reproduction (MAR), which includes in-vitro fertilisation (IVF), provides an important avenue for people experiencing infertility to have children (see Glossary for definitions).

The use of MAR has increased with delayed childbearing and diversifying family structures, including same-sex couples and solo parents. However, MAR still accounts for a relatively small share of births. Between 2010 and 2017, Assisted Reproductive Technology, a subset of MAR which includes IVF, was used in about 5 per cent of all births. This rose to around 6 per cent by 2022.²⁵ This increase has largely been driven by access from women aged 35 to 44 (Chart 19).²⁶

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BOX 5. UNDERSTANDING FERTILITY PATTERNS IN AUSTRALIA (CONTINUED)

In 2022, the average age of women accessing Assisted Reproductive Technology in Australia and New Zealand was 36.²⁷ This was 4.8 years older than the average age of mothers in Australia in the same year.²⁸ While vital for some individuals to start or expand their family, MAR cannot fully counteract the age-related decline in fertility or serve as a universal solution for delayed parenthood. This is because delayed parenthood decreases the likelihood of conceiving, even when using MAR.

Chart 19. NUMBER OF MEDICALLY ASSISTED REPRODUCTION MEDICARE ITEMS ACCESSED BY WOMEN

Note: Includes Medicare items 13209, 13200, 13201, 12303, 13212, 13251, 13218, 13215, 13203, 13221, 13207 and 13241 per calendar year. The latter two items have very low access numbers and only impact the 2023 total. Individuals may access multiple items per cycle and may access items for multiple cycles per year.

Source: Services Australia; *Medicare item reports*; Centre for Population.

23 Department of Social Services; Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, 'The household, income and labour dynamics in Australia (HILDA) survey. GENERAL RELEASE (Waves 1–23)', *ADA Dataverse*, 2024, doi:10.26193/NBTNMV; ABS, [Births, Australia](#); ABS, [Regional population by age and sex](#), 2024.

24 Department of Health, Disability and Aged Care, [About Reproductive Health](#), Department of Health, Disability and Aged Care website, 2023.

25 E Lazzari, E Gray and G Chambers, 'The contribution of assisted reproductive technology to fertility rates and parity transition: an analysis of Australian data', *Demographic Research*, 2021, 45(35):1080-1096, doi:10.4054/DemRes.2021.45.35; ABS, [Births, Australia](#); J E Newman, D P Kotevski, R C Paul, G M Chambers, [Assisted reproductive technology in Australia and New Zealand 2022](#), University of New South Wales, 2024.

26 E Lazzari, E Gray and G Chambers, 'The contribution of assisted reproductive technology to fertility rates and parity transition: an analysis of Australian data'; J E Newman, D P Kotevski, R C Paul, G M Chambers, [Assisted reproductive technology in Australia and New Zealand 2022](#).


27 J E Newman et al., [Assisted reproductive technology in Australia and New Zealand 2022](#).

28 Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (AIHW), [Australia's mothers and babies](#), Australian Government, 2025.

1.3.2 INTERNATIONAL FERTILITY TRENDS

Fertility rates are declining around the world (Charts 20 and 21). While a small number of countries have experienced modest increases in their total fertility rate over the past decade, declines have occurred across most countries and all regions. As in Australia, this in part reflects delayed parenthood with more than one in three births globally in 2023 occurring to women aged 30 and above, compared to one in four in 1990.²⁹

Chart 20. CHANGE IN TOTAL FERTILITY RATES BY COUNTRY, 2013–2023




Note: Total fertility rates in this chart are presented on a calendar year basis and differ from the Centre's projections which are on a financial year basis.

Source: United Nations, *Fertility rate, total (births per woman)*.

29 T Spoorenberg and V Skirbekk, 'A concentration of reproduction to later ages? A worldwide assessment of trends in fertility timing', *Population and Development Review*, 2025, 1-19, doi:10.1111/padr.70036.

Chart 21. TOTAL FERTILITY RATE, SELECTED COUNTRIES



Source: Statistics Canada, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Istituto Nazionale di Statistica, United Nations, Korean Statistical Information Service, ABS and Stats NZ; Centre for Population.


As seen in Australia, there has been a shift toward smaller families internationally. This is reflected in the growing prevalence of one-child families and rising rates of childlessness. However, the increase in childlessness varies across countries. Some countries have had larger rises in childlessness due to specific cultural and gender norms, while others have had smaller rises.³⁰ Australia has not experienced the sharp rise in childlessness that has been observed in countries such as Japan and Spain. However, the proportion of families that remain childless in Australia has been gradually increasing and is now above the proportion of childless families in countries such as the United States and Denmark (Chart 22).³¹

Data on cohorts who completed their typical childbearing years between 2021 and 2025 showed that the most common number of children per family was two in Spain, Japan, Denmark and Canada. Families with two children accounted for 34 to 46 per cent of all families in these countries. In contrast, families with three or more children were most common in the United States. The second most common family size varies. In Canada and Denmark, families with three or more children were the second most common family size. In Spain, one-child families were the second most common, while in Japan families with no children were the second most common.³²

30 Centre for Population, [Fertility decline: Is it here to stay?](#)

31 Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research, [Cohort parity](#), Human Fertility Database website, 2025; ABS, [Census of Population and Housing](#), 2022.

32 Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research, [Cohort parity](#).

Chart 22. COMPLETED FERTILITY PATTERNS BY COUNTRY, WOMEN AGED 44–49

Note: The age range for Australia is 45 to 49 due to data availability.

Source: Human Fertility Database 2025 (the most recent data available for each jurisdiction was used); ABS, *Census of Population and Housing, 2021*.

1.4 MORTALITY AND LIFE EXPECTANCY

There were around 184,000 deaths across Australia in 2024–25, 0.4 per cent fewer than in 2023–24.³³ Of these, around 2,500 were due to COVID-19, a decline of 67 per cent from the peak recorded in 2022–23. Despite this decline, COVID-19 still accounted for over twice as many deaths as influenza in 2024–25.³⁴

The number of deaths is projected to increase from 186,000 in 2025–26 to 235,000 in 2035–36 driven by a growing and ageing population. As the population ages, the prevalence of chronic conditions is also rising.³⁵

Chronic conditions are more common in older age groups, increasing from 28 per cent of people aged 0 to 14 years to 94 per cent of people aged 85 and over. This is largely due to susceptibility to chronic diseases increasing with age, including for dementia, cardiovascular disease, and musculoskeletal disorders. In 2022, chronic conditions were recorded as an underlying or associated cause in 90 per cent of all deaths.³⁶

Mortality rates for each age group are assumed to return to pre-pandemic trends from 2028–29 and continue to decline in line with historical patterns. While these projections are based on the most recent data and observed trends, the medium-term and long-term effects of COVID-19 on mortality remain uncertain.

33 ABS, *Provisional mortality statistics*, 2025.

34 ABS, *Deaths due to acute respiratory infections in Australia*, 2025.

35 ABS, *Chronic Conditions*, 2018; ABS, *Health Conditions Prevalence* 2023; Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (AIHW), *Chronic Conditions*, Australian Government, 2024.

36 AIHW, *Chronic conditions*.

1.4.1 LIFE EXPECTANCY


In the period 2022–2024, Australia’s life expectancy remained unchanged from the 2021–2023 period, at 85.1 years for women and 81.1 years for men.³⁷ It is worth noting that these measures of life expectancy include the 2022 year, which had a higher level of COVID-19-related excess mortality that has since subsided. This means that Australia’s life expectancy has likely increased since 2023. Australia continues to have among the highest life expectancies globally, although recent comparisons have been complicated by variations in the timing and severity of COVID-19 as well as the availability of internationally comparable data. Australia has one of the smallest gaps in life expectancy between men and women, at four years.³⁸

Outside of the COVID-19 pandemic, Australia’s life expectancy has risen steadily since the 1960s. Gains in life expectancy have been driven by advances in medical knowledge and technology, greater access to health care and overall improvements in living standards.³⁹ By 2035–36, life expectancy is projected to reach 87.1 years for women and 83.4 years for men (Chart 23). Australians are living longer in both full health and ill health (Box 6). Longer life expectancy contributes to an ageing population, with broader implications for the economy.

As part of the Measuring What Matters Framework, the Government has recognised the importance of having a society in which people feel well and are in good physical and mental health. The Measuring What Matters Framework measures life expectancy under the dimension ‘healthy throughout life’ to help track progress towards a more healthy, secure, sustainable, cohesive and prosperous Australia. Further details can be found on the ABS website.⁴⁰

Despite recent gains, there is still a gap between First Nations people and the wider Australian population for life expectancy. In 2020–2022, First Nations men were expected to live 71.9 years, 8.8 years less than non-Indigenous men for the same period. First Nations women were expected to live 75.6 years, 8.1 years less than non-Indigenous women for the same period. In 2024, First Nations people also exhibited higher death rates than non-Indigenous people for 19 of the top 20 leading causes of death.⁴¹

Chart 23. HISTORICAL AND PROJECTED LIFE EXPECTANCY



Source: Custom data from Australian Government Actuary; ABS, *Life expectancy 2022–24*; Centre for Population.

37 ABS, *Life Expectancy* 2025.

38 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), *Life expectancy*, OECD, 2025.


39 AIHW, *Changing patterns of mortality in Australia since 1900*, Australian Government, 2022.

40 ABS, *Measuring what matters: life expectancy*, 2025.

41 ABS, *Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander life expectancy*, 2025.

Box 6. HEALTH-ADJUSTED LIFE EXPECTANCY IN AUSTRALIA

Health-adjusted life expectancy is the average number of years people can expect to live in full health, free from injury or disability. In 2024, Australian males could expect to live an average of 71.7 years (88 per cent of their lives) in full health, while females could expect to live an average of 73.8 years (86 per cent of their lives) in full health. These proportions of full health have fallen slightly since 2003 (Chart 24).⁴²

Chart 24. HEALTH-ADJUSTED LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH, 2024

Note: The number of years lived without disability is calculated using Sullivan's method, which applies age-specific rates of health loss (years lived with disability) to life expectancy data from standard life tables.

Source: AIHW, *Australian Burden of Disease Study 2024*; Centre for Population.

As Australians live longer, the number of years lived in both full health and ill health is growing.⁴³ The additional years spent in ill health are increasing demand for, and expenditure on, health and aged care services.

The increase in years spent in ill health is driven by a range of factors. Chronic health conditions and lifestyle factors play a key role, with around 61 per cent of all Australians now living with at least one chronic health condition.⁴⁴ Additionally, people in regional and remote communities often face inequitable access to healthcare and support services. Policies promoting lifelong health, disease prevention and health care access can improve both the quality and length of a person's life.⁴⁵

42 AIHW, *Australian Burden of Disease Study 2024*, Australian Government, 2024.

43 ABS, *Measuring what matters: life expectancy*.

44 AIHW, *Chronic Conditions*.

45 International Monetary Fund, *World Economic Outlook: A Critical Juncture amid Policy Shifts*, IMF website, 2025; AIHW, *Chronic Conditions*.

1.4.2 CAUSES OF DEATH

The five leading causes of death accounted for one third of all registered deaths in the 2024 calendar year. In order, these were: dementia (including Alzheimer's disease), ischaemic heart disease (IHD, reduced or blocked blood and oxygen supply to the heart), chronic lower respiratory diseases, cerebrovascular diseases (conditions that affect blood flow to the brain) and lung cancer.

The rankings of the top five causes of death changed from 2023 to 2024, with dementia displacing IHD as the leading cause of death and chronic respiratory diseases rising from fifth to the third leading cause of death. Dementia accounted for 8 per cent more deaths than IHD in 2024. Dementia was the leading cause of death for females. IHD was the leading cause of death for males and people living in outer regional and remote areas.

COVID-19 mortality was much lower in 2024 than in 2022 and 2023, falling from the third to the 12th leading cause of death over this period. It accounted for 2.1 per cent of deaths in 2024.

There were 5,600 deaths of First Nations people in 2024. The age distribution of deaths for First Nations people varies from those across the wider Australian population, with a greater proportion of deaths occurring at younger ages.

The five leading causes of death for First Nations people are different from those for the wider Australian population. In order, these were: IHD, chronic lower respiratory diseases, diabetes, lung cancer and intentional self-harm (suicide). These causes also show the largest differences in age-standardised death rates when compared to the wider Australian population.⁴⁶

As the population ages, there is likely to be an increase in deaths from dementia, respiratory diseases and selected types of cancers, as these are responsible for more deaths among older age cohorts.⁴⁷ At the same time, climate change is increasing the frequency and severity of extreme weather events. These events place the body under thermal stress and expose people to more physical risk. The National Climate Risk Assessment found that these events increase mortality risks for people with underlying health conditions, who are more likely to be older.⁴⁸

46 ABS, [Causes of Death, Australia](#), 2025.

47 ABS, [Increase in deaths reflects ageing population](#), 2025.

48 Australian Climate Service, [Australia's first National Climate Risk Assessment](#), Australian Government, 2025.


1.5 POPULATION AGEING

Australia's population is ageing because of lower fertility rates and higher life expectancy. This demographic shift presents long-term economic and fiscal challenges, particularly driving up demand for health and aged care services. Migration can slow population ageing and add to the working-age population because migrants are typically younger than the overall Australian population.

Although the population is projected to continue ageing, Australia's working-age population is expected to continue to grow by 0.8 per cent per year on average. In contrast, the proportion of OECD countries projected to have declining working-age populations is expected to increase from 40 per cent today to 80 per cent by the mid-2060s.⁴⁹

Changes in the age structure illustrate these trends (Chart 25). Between 2005–06 and 2065–66, lower fertility will reduce the population share of the 0 to 20 years age group. This age group is projected to grow by 56 per cent between 2005–06 and 2065–66. By comparison, the size of the population aged 65 years and over is projected to grow by 264 per cent and the population aged 85 years and over is projected to grow by 506 per cent during the same period. By 2065–66, there will be 1.9 million people 85 and over, up from 580,000 today.

Chart 25. PROPORTION OF POPULATION AT EACH AGE



Source: ABS, *National, state and territory population, March 2025*; Centre for Population projections.

49 UN Population Division, *World Population Prospects*, UN Population Division website, 2024.

Box 7. HOW FERTILITY AND MIGRATION INFLUENCE POPULATION AGEING


Higher fertility rates and levels of migration can help to slow or even reverse increases in the average age of the population. However, fertility and migration have different effects on the population’s age structure. Two modelling exercises were developed to explore these impacts. The exercises were calibrated to result in 40,000 people being added to the population each year from 2031–32 onwards, through either more births or higher migration.

Both modelling exercises result in similar total populations by 2065–66 at around 43 million, compared with 41 million in the base line (Chart 26). Beyond 2065–66, the total population size would diverge between the exercises. This is because in the high-fertility modelling, the additional children would have enough time to become adults and have children of their own. In the high-migration modelling, the additional migrants age enough to begin increasing the number of deaths.

While the two modelling exercises result in similar populations by 2065–66, their effects on the age structure are significant, and differ in magnitude. Compared to the baseline, both modelling exercises reduce the median age of the population (Chart 27), with the high fertility modelling resulting in a greater reduction.


By 2065–66, higher fertility reduces the median age by 2 years while higher migration results in a fall of 0.4 years. This reflects that the additional babies are younger compared to the additional migrant arrivals. This effect would compound over time beyond 2065–66, further slowing the rate of population ageing.

Chart 26. TOTAL POPULATION




Source: ABS, *National, state and territory population, March 2025*; Centre for Population.

Chart 27. MEDIAN AGE



Source: ABS, *National, state and territory population, March 2025*; Centre for Population.

The median age, old-age dependency ratio, and proportion of the population aged over 65 years measure population ageing (Chart 28). Australia’s median age was 38.3 years in 2023–24, up from 28.4 years in 1975–76. It is expected to reach 40.2 years by 2035–36 and 43.7 years by 2065–66.


Chart 28. MEASURES OF POPULATION AGEING

Note: The old-age dependency ratio is the number of people aged 65 years and over per 100 people aged 15 to 64.
 Source: ABS, *National, state and territory population, March 2025*; Centre for Population.

Growth in the median age of the population was fastest in the 1970s, 80s and 90s. The median age, on average, increased by 0.3 each year from 1970–71 to 1999–2000. Since the 2000s, the rate of increase in the median age has slowed to 0.1 each year. Reforms in the 1990s and early 2000s, which reoriented the migration system towards younger and more skilled migrants, contributed to the slowdown in ageing. Migrants are typically younger, on average, than the resident population. In 2023–24, the median age of migrant arrivals was 27.1 years while it was 38.3 years for the resident population.

In the absence of the 1990s and 2000s migration reforms, Australia’s population would be much older (Chart 29). If Australia’s median age had continued to rise at the rate recorded prior to 2000, the median age of 40 years would have been reached 18 years earlier than currently projected. If this trajectory continued over the long term, the median age would reach 55 years in 2065–66, rather than 43.7 years in the current projection for 2065–66.

Chart 29. MEDIAN AGE – PROJECTED AND HYPOTHETICAL



Source: ABS, National, state and territory population, March 2025; Centre for Population.

2. SUB NATIONAL POPULATIONS

2.1 OVERVIEW OF THE STATES AND TERRITORIES

Population characteristics vary around the country, bringing different opportunities and challenges across service delivery, infrastructure planning, and economic development. Population projections at the state and territory level provide insights into this variation.

Population growth across the states and territories has declined from recent highs due to the recent fall in net overseas migration (NOM) nationally (Chart 30). From 2025–26 onwards, population ageing and ongoing low fertility are expected to slow natural increase and reduce long-run population growth rates.


In 2025–26, Western Australia is expected to have the highest population growth rate (1.8 per cent), with particularly elevated NOM and positive net internal migration (NIM). Tasmania is forecast to have the lowest population growth rate (0.1 per cent).

Over the next ten years, Western Australia, Victoria and Queensland are projected to be the fastest growing states. Growth in Western Australia and Victoria is expected to be driven by NOM. Queensland's growth is expected to be underpinned by NIM.

Tasmania and South Australia are expected to be the slowest growing states from 2026–27 to 2035–36. Both have a relatively small share of NOM, little or negative NIM, and low natural increase because of their older population age structures.

New South Wales is projected to maintain its position as Australia's most populous state reaching 9.6 million people by 2035–36, accounting for 30.6 per cent of the national population.

Chart 30. POPULATION GROWTH, STATES AND TERRITORIES




Source: ABS, *National, state and territory population*, March 2025; Centre for Population.

The Centre has developed experimental population projections extending to 2065–66 at more detailed geographic levels than previously published. These experimental projections provide insights into how populations may change across states and territories, capital cities and rest-of-state areas, supporting longer-term planning and policy decisions. Over this extended 40 year projection period to 2065–66, the four fastest growing states will be Victoria, Queensland, Western Australia and the ACT (each averaging 1.1 per cent growth annually), while Tasmania will be the slowest growing state (0.1 per cent average growth).

2.1.1 AGEING ACROSS THE STATES AND TERRITORIES

Over time, the gap between the state and territory with the youngest and oldest median age has widened (Chart 31). In 1975–76, the gap between the youngest median age (Northern Territory, 24 years old) and oldest median age (New South Wales, 29.3 years old) was 5.3 years. In 2021–22, the gap between the youngest median age (Northern Territory, 33.4 years old) and oldest median age (Tasmania, 41.7 years old) was 8.2 years. This gap is projected to widen to 10.3 years by 2035–36.

Chart 31. POPULATION AGEING: DIFFERENCE BETWEEN STATE AND NATIONAL MEDIAN AGE



Source: ABS, National, state and territory population, March 2025; Centre for Population.


2.2 NET INTERNAL MIGRATION

Net internal migration (NIM) is a source of population growth for some areas and population decline for others. NIM flows are influenced by a range of factors, including the age of individuals moving in and out of an area, cyclical economic factors, employment opportunities and lifestyle preferences (Box 8).

The share of the population moving interstate each year has been declining since the 1990s, when it averaged around 2 per cent, reflecting an older population that is less likely to relocate and a higher share of dual-income households.⁵⁰ When both adults in a household are working, relocations are more complex and have higher associated costs.⁵¹ Only 1.5 per cent of the population is forecast to move interstate in 2027–28, and a lower proportion of 1.4 per cent is expected to move in 2065–66.

NIM trends have remained consistent since the 1980s. New South Wales, South Australia, and the Northern Territory tend to lose residents, while Queensland gains them (Chart 32). NIM trends by age also tend to follow set patterns over time. The Australian Capital Territory receives inflows of people under 35 and outflows of those aged 50 to 69. Tasmania tends to experience the opposite, with inflows of people over 45 and outflows of those aged 15 to 24.⁵²

Chart 32. NET INTERNAL MIGRATION BY STATE, 2023–24



Note: Combined other states includes South Australia, Tasmania, the Northern Territory and the Australian Capital Territory. Charts use different y-axis scales due to differences in population size.

Source: ABS, *Regional Internal Migration Estimates*, Centre for Population.

50 ABS, *National, state and territory population, March 2025*, 2025.

51 The Centre for International Economics, *Internal migration in Australia and the impact of government levers*, report to the Australian Government Department of the Treasury, Centre for Population, 2023.

52 ABS, *Interstate migration: Arrivals, departures and net, State/territory, Age and sex – Financial years, 1996–97 onwards*.

Box 8. WHAT MOTIVATES MOVES WITHIN AND BETWEEN AUSTRALIA’S LARGEST CAPITAL CITIES

Despite having similar urban characteristics, Sydney, Melbourne, and Brisbane have long exhibited distinct levels and patterns of NIM.⁵³ The reasons for internal migration depend on the stage of life an individual is in, and whether they are moving within (intra-city move) or between (inter-city move) cities. Younger people tend to move for work and education while older people move for family and relationships or lifestyle and health reasons (Chart 33). Moves within these cities are often driven by housing, while moves between these cities are more likely to be motivated by family and work.


People were more likely to move within their own city than to another city within Australia. Between 2003 and 2022, there were 24.4 million moves within Sydney, Melbourne and Brisbane, yet there were only 6.8 million moves into or out of these cities.

Housing was the main reason for moves within a city, with many people citing the desire to upsize or move into their own residence (renting or buying their first or subsequent house).⁵⁴ This is reflected in NIM patterns, particularly in Sydney and Melbourne, with the highest inflows concentrated in areas with high levels of residential construction.⁵⁵ Family and relationship, and involuntary reasons – including evictions, temporary relocations and government housing transfers – were the next most common reasons for moving within a city.

Chart 33. REASONS FOR ARRIVING AND DEPARTING SYDNEY, MELBOURNE AND BRISBANE, 2003–2022

INTRA-CITY MOVES

INTER-CITY MOVES



Source: Centre for Population analysis of Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) survey data.

Box continued on next page

53 ABS, [Regional Internal Migration Estimates by Region \(SA2 and above\), 2006–07 to 2015–16](#), 2025; ABS, [RIME by region of arrival by departure, SA4 and above \(ASGS 2016\), 2016–17 to 2020–21](#), 2025; ABS, [RIME by region of arrival by departure, SA4 and above \(ASGS Edition 3\), 2021–22 onwards](#), 2025.


54 Department of Social Services; Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, ‘The household, income and labour dynamics in Australia (HILDA) survey. GENERAL RELEASE (Waves 1–23)’.

55 ABS, [Census of Population and Housing, 2022](#); Urban Development Institute of Australia (UDIA), [UDIA State of the land 2022: National greenfield and apartment market study](#), UDIA National website, 2022.

BOX 8. WHAT MOTIVATES MOVES WITHIN AND BETWEEN AUSTRALIA'S LARGEST CAPITAL CITIES (CONTINUED)

Family and relationships, work, and lifestyle and health played a much larger role in moves between cities. Sydney and Melbourne had more inflows for education and work reasons, which is due to most internal migrants being under 30 (Chart 34). In contrast, Brisbane received net inflows across almost all ages. While family and relationships, and work were the key reasons for moves to Brisbane, housing was also cited as a factor more often than it was for moves to Sydney and Melbourne. This likely reflects the higher prevalence of families among Brisbane's arrivals and the comparatively lower cost of housing in the period analysed.

Chart 34. NET INTERNAL MIGRATION BY AGE, SYDNEY, MELBOURNE AND BRISBANE, 2017–2021



Source: ABS, *Annual interstate and intrastate arrivals and departures by age and sex, Greater Capital Statistical Area*; Centre for Population.

2.3 CAPITAL CITIES AND REST-OF-STATE AREAS

In 2023–24, the population of Australia's capital cities was 18.4 million, representing 68 per cent of the total population. The population in the rest-of-state areas was 8.8 million, 32 per cent of the total population. By 2035–36, the capital city population is expected to reach 21.8 million, an increase of 18 per cent. The population in the rest-of-state areas is projected to increase by 10 per cent to 9.6 million. Capital cities are projected to grow nearly twice as fast as the rest-of-state areas, with average annual growth of 1.4 per cent compared to rest-of-state regions at 0.8 per cent.


NOM and natural increase drive population growth in capital cities (Chart 35). By 2035–36, Perth (1.5 per cent and a population of 2.9 million) is projected to be the fastest growing capital city, followed by Melbourne (1.5 per cent and 6.5 million), while Hobart (0.4 per cent and 266,000) is expected to be the slowest growing. Overseas migrants predominantly settle in Australia's major capital cities, particularly Sydney and Melbourne, as these cities are home to major higher education providers and have large labour markets and established migrant communities. Population growth in capital cities from NOM is slightly offset by outflows of NIM to rest-of-state areas.

Sub national populations

In aggregate, NIM flows from capital cities to rest-of-state areas have grown. NIM to rest-of-state areas was 31,000 in the year to March 2025, 0.9 per cent above 2017–18 levels.⁵⁶ NIM to rest-of-state areas is projected to be 28,000 by 2035–36.

The rest-of-state population share, compared to the respective capital cities in that state, is declining in all states except Queensland. This urbanisation trend across states and territories, excluding Queensland, is expected to continue over the long term. Although NIM to rest-of-state areas rose above its historical average of around 20,000 in 2023–24 and is expected to remain above this level, the population share of capital cities continues to increase.

Chart 35. CUMULATIVE CONTRIBUTION TO GROWTH UNTIL 2035–36



Note: The “R” refers to “rest-of-state” areas.

Source: ABS, *National, state and territory population, March 2025*; Centre for Population.

As outlined earlier, the Centre has produced experimental population projections extending to 2065–66, offering more detailed geographic insights than previously published. The Centre’s new method for projecting NIM beyond 2027–28 scales internal arrival rates based on changes in each state’s population share. This prevents unrealistic NIM trends and aligns with international practice (see Technical Appendix for more detail).



By 2065–66, 29.6 million (72 per cent) of Australians are projected to reside in capital cities, up from the current 68 per cent. Melbourne is expected to be Australia’s most populous city, reaching 9.1 million people by 2065–66. This is expected to be followed by Sydney at 8.5 million. In contrast, Hobart’s population is expected to reach 278,000 and Darwin 234,000.

While capital cities’ growth rates will gradually slow, they are expected to continue to grow faster than rest-of-state areas. An exception is the rest-of-Queensland, which is projected to keep pace with Brisbane’s growth due to positive net interstate migration. The rest-of-Northern Territory and the rest-of-Tasmania are expected to record negative growth rates (Chart 36).



⁵⁶ ABS, *National, state and territory population, March 2025*.

Chart 36. POPULATION GROWTH, CAPITAL CITIES AND REST-OF-STATE AREAS

CAPITAL CITIES



REST-OF-STATE AREAS



Note: The "R" refers to "rest-of-state" areas.

Source: ABS, *Regional population, 2023-24*; Centre for Population.

2.3.1 AGEING IN CAPITAL CITIES AND REST-OF-STATE AREAS

Populations in regional areas are older than in capital cities in all states and territories, except the Northern Territory.⁵⁷ This is due to age-specific interstate and intrastate migration, with young adults migrating to capital cities for education and employment opportunities, while older residents tend to leave capital cities for regional, especially coastal, areas.⁵⁸

In New South Wales, Victoria and South Australia, nearly all coastal Statistical Area 2s (SA2s) outside of capital cities have a median age above 45 years (Charts 37 and 38, see also interactive dashboards on the Centre's website). In Queensland and Western Australia, most SA2s with median ages over 50 years are located along the coast or surrounding capital cities. In Tasmania, nearly all SA2s outside of Hobart and Launceston have median ages above 40 years. In contrast, SA2s with higher median ages in the Northern Territory are concentrated in and around Darwin. In the Australian Capital Territory, which has a younger age profile, 26.1 per cent of SA2s have a median age below 35 and only 4.5 per cent have a median age above 50.


In 2023–24, in aggregate, around 21 per cent of the population outside capital cities was aged 65 years and over. In capital cities, only 15 per cent of the population was aged 65 years and over. By 2035–36, around 25 per cent of the population outside capital cities is projected to be aged 65 years and over, with 17 per cent in capital cities.⁵⁹

57 ABS, [Regional population by age and sex](#), 2025.

58 Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development, Communications, Sport and the Arts (DITRDSCA), [Population change and internal migration during the COVID-19 pandemic](#), DITRDSCA, Australian Government, 2024.

59 ABS, [Regional population by age and sex](#).


Chart 37. MEDIAN AGE BY STATISTICAL AREA 2, AUSTRALIA, 2023–24



Population change and median age by SA3 | Centre for Population

Source: ABS, *Regional population by age and sex, 2024*.

Chart 38. MEDIAN AGE BY STATISTICAL AREA 2, LARGE CAPITAL CITIES, 2023–24



[Population change and median age by SA3 | Centre for Population](#)

Source: ABS, *Regional population by age and sex, 2024*.

3. COMPARING PAST PROJECTIONS TO OUTCOMES

Differences between projected and actual population outcomes arise from a range of factors. These include changes in migration patterns, fertility rates, migration policy settings, and revisions to historical data. Forecasts are based on assumptions that may not fully capture how trends evolve over time.

Forecasts contained in Population Statements released between 2020 and 2022 underestimated the strength of the recovery in Australia's population following the COVID-19 pandemic, which resulted in previously noted forecast misses, particularly for net overseas migration. Since the 2023 Population Statement, improvements in methodology and more stable arrival patterns have contributed to more reliable near-term projections of net overseas migration.

More recently, forecast challenges have shifted toward births and migrant departures. At the state and territory level, discrepancies often reflect the national misses. However, net interstate migration has been a relatively persistent contributor to the forecast misses outside the capital cities of the larger states. Additionally, updates to historical population estimates have had effects at the subnational level.

Further detail on comparing past projections to outcomes is available in the Technical Appendix.

GLOSSARY

Assisted Reproductive Technology

Assisted Reproductive Technology is a specific term referring to treatments that fertilise an egg outside the body. It is a subset of Medically Assisted Reproduction (MAR).

Average household representation propensity

A measure of average per capita dwelling demand. Dwelling demand is primarily inferred through a person's relationship in a household (RLHP). RLHP is asked in the Census and describes the relationship of each person in a family to the family reference person.

Contribution to growth

How much a particular component contributes to the growth rate of the aggregate. Unless otherwise specified, it refers to the percentage point contribution.

For example, population growth was 1.7 per cent in 2018–19. The contribution to growth from NOM was 1.1 percentage points and the contribution to growth from natural increase was 0.6 percentage points.

Fertility

In demography, fertility refers to the number of children born, while in medical science it means the ability to have children.

Fertility intentions

The total number of children a person intends to have after being confronted by economic, social or individual factors.

Greater Capital City Statistical Areas (GCCSA)

Greater Capital City Statistical Areas (GCCSAs) are geographic areas built from Statistical Areas Level 4 (SA4s). GCCSA boundaries represent labour markets and the functional area of Australian capital cities respectively.⁶⁰

Infertility

Infertility is the inability to achieve a successful pregnancy based on a patient's medical, sexual, and reproductive history, age, physical findings, diagnostic testing, or any combination of these factors, thus requiring medical intervention/s to achieve a successful pregnancy either as an individual or with a partner.

Intercensal difference

The difference in the official population estimate based on the Census and the estimates derived from administrative data sources which cannot be attributed to a particular source.⁶¹

60 ABS, [Australian Statistical Geography Standard Edition 3](#), 2021.

61 ABS, [National, state and territory population methodology](#), ABS website, 2025.

Internal migration

The movement of people across a specified boundary within Australia involving a change in place of usual residence. Net internal migration is the difference between arrivals and departures and can be either positive or negative.

Interstate migration

The movement of people over a state or territory boundary involving a change in place of usual residence. Net interstate migration is the difference between arrivals and departures and can be either positive or negative.

Life expectancy (period)

A measure of how long a person would be expected to live if they experienced the age and sex-specific mortality rates from a single year. It represents the average number of years a person would live from a specific age. This differs from cohort life expectancy, which estimates how long a person would live if they experienced projected age and sex-specific mortality rates across their lifetime. In this Statement, 'life expectancy' refers to the period life expectancy at birth.

Old-age dependency ratio

The number of people aged 65 years and over per 100 people aged 15 to 64.

Overseas migrant arrival

An incoming international traveller who stays in Australia for 12 months or more over a 16-month period, who is not currently counted within the population, and is then added to the population.

Overseas migrant departure

An outgoing international traveller who leaves Australia for 12 months or more over a 16-month period, who is currently counted within the population, and is then subtracted from the population.

Overseas migrant – permanent ('permanent migrant')

An overseas migrant who holds a permanent visa. Generally, permanent visa holders can live, work and study with fewer restrictions than temporary visa holders in Australia.

Overseas migrant – temporary ('temporary migrant')

An overseas migrant who holds a temporary visa, excluding New Zealand citizens. Temporary visas grant authority to stay in Australia for a specific period for a specific purpose (such as work or study). A 'temporary migrant' refers to the type of visa the migrant holds rather than when (or whether) they will ultimately depart Australia. An incoming traveller holding a temporary visa is an overseas migrant when they stay in Australia for 12 months or more over a 16-month period. While the Special Category visa (SCV) granted to New Zealand citizens is technically a temporary visa, New Zealand citizens are not considered temporary migrants as SCV holders may freely live and work in Australia.

Medically Assisted Reproduction

Medically Assisted Reproduction (MAR) covers a broad range of treatments that fertilise the egg inside the body, such as artificial insemination, or outside the body, such as in-vitro fertilisation (IVF).

Natural increase

The population change resulting from the number of births minus the number of deaths over a given period.

Net overseas migration (NOM)

The net gain or loss of population through immigration to, and emigration from, Australia. It is measured as the difference between the number of migrant arrivals and the number of migrant departures. This includes individuals on both permanent and temporary visas, as well as returning and departing Australian citizens.

Population

The official measure of Australia's population based on the concept of usual residence – known as estimated resident population. It refers to all people, regardless of nationality or citizenship, who usually live in Australia, except foreign diplomatic personnel and their families. It includes usual residents who are overseas for less than 12 months. It excludes overseas visitors who are in Australia for less than 12 months (refer to definition of 'net overseas migration').⁶²

Recuperation

Recuperation refers to an increase in births at older ages that compensates for a delay in childbearing at younger ages.

Replacement rate

The number of children a woman would need to have over her reproductive lifespan to replace herself and her partner. Given not all children survive to reproductive age and are slightly more likely to be male, replacement fertility is around 2.1 children per woman in advanced economies. This figure is in the absence of migration.

Rest-of-state area

The area within each state that is not defined as being part of the Greater Capital City.⁶³

Statistical area level 2

Medium sized areas with a population between 3,000 to 25,000 people (10,000 on average), as defined by the Australian Bureau of Statistics.⁶⁴

Statistical area level 3

Geographic areas with a population between 30,000 and 130,000 people, as defined by the Australian Bureau of Statistics.⁶⁵

Statistical area level 4

Geographic areas with a population above 100,000 people, as defined by the Australian Bureau of Statistics.⁶⁶

Total fertility rate

An estimate of the number of children a woman would have during her lifetime if she experienced the age-specific fertility rates for a given year at each age of her reproductive life.

62 ABS, [National, state and territory population methodology](#), 2025.

63 ABS, [Australian Statistical Geography Standard Edition 3](#).

64 ABS, [Statistical area level 2](#), 2021.

65 ABS, [Statistical area level 3](#), 2021.

66 ABS, [Statistical area level 4](#), 2021.

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